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Abstract 
Although the phenomenon of refugee flows is not devoid of economic connotations, it has so 
far been investigated primarily by political scientists and sociologists.  The analytical tools of 
economic inquiry have not yet been applied to this subject, although it stands to reason that 
such a study will contribute to our understanding of why refugee flows occur and will guide 
the policy response.  This note illustrates how economic analysis can be brought to bear on 
three key aspects of refugee flows: fear, poverty, and group movement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The phenomenon of refugee flows has eluded economic analysis for a long time.  Yet 
both the causes and the consequences of refugee flows lend themselves to economic 
analysis.  This note takes a step in this direction. 
 
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates 
that by the end of 2000 there were 11.7 million refugees in the world.  Since its 
founding in 1951 (to assist about one million Europeans who were still homeless five 
years after the end of World War II) the agency reports that “the number of uprooted 
people climbed ... to eight million by the start of the 1980s and then to a peak of more 
than 27 million in 1995.”  In many particular settings the numbers involved are very 
large.  For example, from 1979 onwards, Afghanistan produced more than six million 
refugees, and in 1994 more than one million refugees crossed into Zaire in a mere few 
days (Wilkinson, 2000).  It is inconceivable that a phenomenon that is neither trivial 
nor random is devoid of economic underpinnings or is not deserving of economic 
analysis. 
 
 Refugee flows differ from standard migration (henceforth migration) in two 
important respects: the flow of refugees is typically a group movement – a large 
number of people move simultaneously – as opposed to a sequenced movement of 
individuals; and refugee flows are overwhelmingly from distinctly poor economies. 
 
 Refugee flows typically arise from the capriciousness of nature and the 
ferocious hostility of fellow human beings.  A deleterious event that impacts harshly 
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on a few (say casualties in a civil strife) triggers a movement by many refugees.  The 
key terms used to account for refugee flows are impoverishment and fear.  In a way, 
this note sketches heuristic economic equivalents of these terms. 
 
 A breakdown of newly arrived refugees by country of origin in 2000 (UNHCR 
2001, Table 7) reveals that five countries produced more than 50,000 refugees each, 
and nine countries produced more than 10,000 refugees each.  All nine countries are 
very poor (eight are in Africa, one – Afghanistan – is in Asia).  What is even more 
tantalizing is that the list of countries producing more than 10,000 refugees each in 
2000 is not all that different from the corresponding list four years earlier: Burundi, 
Rwanda, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia 
feature in both the 1996 list and in the 2000 list.  (The calculations for 1996 are based 
on UNHCR 1997, Table 3).  It is as if a substantial refugees flow at one point in time 
gives rise to a substantial subsequent flow. 
 
2. Analysis 
 
Typically, in poor economies where markets are not well developed production takes 
place in smaller units (villages) than in well-to-do economies.  Production is also 
subject to strong interdependencies or externalities within the production units.1  The 
intersection of a small size of the economic unit within which output is generated and 
spillovers implies that a decline in the productive attribute of one individual affects 
adversely the productivity of all other individuals.  This correlation raises the 
likelihood of refugee flows.  To see how, for a given degree of externalities, an 
adverse shock affecting the human capital of one individual will have a small effect 
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on other individuals’ productivity in a large economy but a profound effect on other 
individuals’ productivity in a small economy, consider an economy in which there are 
n workers and the single production input is labor.  Worker i’s human capital (the sum 
total of his efficiency units of labor) is iθ , and the per-worker concave production 
function is 
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the effect of an adverse shock to i’s human capital on j’s productivity is negative and 
is larger the smaller is n.  Thus, in a large economy, the outcome of 0<iθ∆  is more 
likely to be an individualistic migration as it will possibly prompt only i to leave, 
whereas in a small economy the outcome is more likely to be a refugee flow as other 
workers, along with i, will be prompted to leave. 
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 An economy whose workers are vulnerable to the prospect of becoming 
refugees will be poorer than an economy not facing such a prospect.  To see how this 
happens relax the assumption that the iθ  are given.  Let i   i ∀=θθ .  Workers choose 
how much human capital to form taking into consideration the (gross) returns to 
human capital, )(  f θ , and the costs of forming human capital.  Let these costs be 
θθ kc =)( , where α<k<0  is a constant.  To find out first how much human capital 
is formed by a worker if there is no prospect that the worker will end up as a refugee, 
we write 
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the worker’s chosen level of human capital is 
 
 .01* >−=
k
αθ  
 
 Suppose, alternatively, that workers face the prospect, p, of becoming 
refugees – for example because such an event pervaded a neighboring economy in the 
past and the workers consider their own economy vulnerable to the same exogenous 
forces.  As a refugee, the private returns to a worker’s human capital – the reward to a 
worker’s skill and knowhow – are lowered, say from α  to β , where k  is a αβ <<
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constant.  Assuming that workers depart as a group, the production externalities will 
be retained.  (This argument views externalities as a community asset rather than as a 
geographical attribute; the externalities are specific to a group, not to a locale.) A 
worker’s expected net earnings will therefore be 
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the worker’s chosen level of human capital is 
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assuming that .1<<−
−< pαβ
αk0   Since p > 0 and ,α β < **~ θθ < ; the discouraging 
effect of the refugee eventuality lowers the level of human capital that workers choose 
to form. 
 
 It is further possible to show that not only does poverty raise the likelihood of 
a refugee flow, as argued in the beginning of this section, but also the prospect of a 
refugee status brings about poverty.  Let the level of poverty (social welfare) be 
measured by net earnings per worker, that is, the output per worker less the cost of 
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acquiring the human capital used to generate the output.  If workers do not expect to 
end up as refugees, their net earnings are given by 
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since for any , .1>x 1−> xxlnx 2 
 
 When the refugee probability looms, workers’ net earnings are  
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These net earnings are highest when p is at its lower bound.  Therefore, if welfare 
evaluated at this bound is lower than W then welfare evaluated at any other p will 
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it follows that *)(*)~( θWθ <W ; welfare is affected adversely by the prospect of 
ending up as a refugee even if no worker actually does become a refugee. 
 
3.  Complementary reflections 
 
There can, of course, be other reasons why a refugee flow in a given period invites, 
rather than dampens, a refugee flow in a subsequent period.  Once a relief response 
consisting of support structures, facilities, and amenities (such as camps, schools, 
clinics, wells, and other infrastructure – sometimes referred to by UNHCR as QIPs – 
quick impact projects) that caters for the needs and welfare of refugees is in place, the 
refugee route becomes more inviting.  It is a moral hazard of sorts.  For example, the 
construction of camps and associated facilities in Iran and Pakistan for refugees who 
fled Afghanistan in the wake of the 1979 Soviet invasion may have contributed to the 
considerable follow-up refugee flows taking place in the wake of the dramatic rise of 
the Taliban in 1994-96.  A response of this type is not without a historical precedent.  
There is interesting evidence that in Europe, from the Middle Ages until the 
seventeenth century, changes in the manner in which prisoners of war were treated 
(including the ease with which they were ransomed) affected the incidence - and 
apparently the incentive - of being taken prisoner (Frey and Buhofer, 1988).  For 
example, two religious orders founded at the turn of the twelfth century were 
prominent until the French Revolution in the ransom and release of prisoners of war.  
These orders were reported to have arranged for the ransom and release of about one 
million prisoners.  Such activities appear to have contributed positively to the 
likelihood of falling prisoner, just as the increased brutality of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars and the lower likelihood of exchanges of prisoners led to a decline 
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in the likelihood of falling prisoner.  To some extent, a soldier may choose to seek 
refuge in a prison camp and a civilian may choose to seek relief in a refugee camp. 
 
 A complete analysis of the dynamics of refugee flows is beyond the scope of 
this note.  But it is tempting to speculate on the nature of this dynamics, especially as 
it may involve interactions between refugee flows and migration.  A significant 
explanatory variable of the destination choice of migrants is the presence and size of a 
stock of past migrants.  The stock may well consist of refugees who were integrated 
economically in the receiving country.  Thus, if B had been the destination of refugees 
from A at time t, this event could account for the migration from A to B of workers at 
points in time subsequent to t.  To the extent that labor migration alleviates conditions 
that otherwise could evolve to induce a flow of refugees, labor migration could 
preempt a subsequent refugee movement.  For example, considerable evidence 
suggests that labor migration is shadowed by remittance flows in a reverse direction, 
and that these remittances mitigate the impact of droughts, alleviate poverty, and 
facilitate technological change in agricultural production.3  Events may so unfold that 
return may become an appealing option for refugees.  It will be helpful to analyze 
return flows, to explain why some refugees return while others do not, and to 
characterize the returnees.   
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Notes 
 
1. Vivid accounts of the strong production interdependencies in villages in 
developing countries are provided by Myrdall (1968, especially chapter 26). 
 
2. Showing that for any  x ,  1> 1−> xxlnx   is equivalent to showing that for 
any ,   1>x .
e
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
 x
e
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positive. 
 
3. The econometric implication of this argument is that in estimating the 
incidence of refugee flows for a sample of economies, previous migration (the 
economy’s prevailing “migration stock”) should appear as a right-hand side 
explanatory variable with the associated coefficient having a negative sign. 
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